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Abstract
In the context of public key cryptography, the McEliece cryptosystem represents a very
smart solution based on the hardness of the decoding problem, which is believed to be able
to resist the advent of quantum computers. Despite this, the original McEliece cryptosystem,
based on Goppa codes, has encountered limited interest in practical applications, partly because
of some constraints imposed by this very special class of codes. We have recently introduced
a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem including low-density parity-check codes, that are
state-of-the-art codes, now used in many telecommunication standards and applications. In
this paper, we discuss the possible use of a bit-flipping decoder in this context, which gives
a significant advantage in terms of complexity. We also provide theoretical arguments and
practical tools for estimating the trade-off between security and complexity, in such a way to
give a simple procedure for the system design.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, a renewed interest has been devoted to the McEliece cryptosystem [1], which
is one of the most attractive options for post-quantum public key cryptography. It exploits error
correcting codes to obtain both the private and the public key. Its security relies on the difficulty
This work was supported in part by the MIUR project “ESCAPADE” (Grant RBFR105NLC) under the “FIRB -
Futuro in Ricerca 2010” funding program.
2of decoding a linear block code without any known structure. More precisely, two kinds of
attacks can be mounted against this system. The former aims at retrieving the private key from
the public key, while the latter tries to recover the cleartext from the ciphertext, without the
knowledge of the private key. The first kind of attack can be avoided through a suitable choice of
the codes to be used in the system, and of their parameters. The second kind of attack basically
consists in decrypting the intercepted ciphertext without knowing the private key. This can be
achieved by using information set decoding algorithms on the public code. Algorithms of this
kind have been investigated since a long time [1], [2]. Other approaches exploit improvements
of the probabilistic algorithm first proposed by Stern in [3]. These are presented in [4] and,
more recently, in [5], [6], [7], [8], [9].
The original version of the McEliece cryptosystem, based on binary Goppa codes with
irreducible generator polynomials, is faster than the widespread RSA cryptosystem. However, it
has two major drawbacks: large keys and low transmission rate, the latter being coincident with
the code rate. The McEliece cryptosystem uses generator matrices and encodes the messages
into codewords of the public code. Niederreiter proposed a code-based cryptosystem using
the parity-check matrix and Generalized Reed–Solomon (GRS) codes [10]. This proposal was
broken by Sidelnikov and Shestakov [11]; however, it still works with Goppa codes, as shown in
[12]. The main advantage of Niederreiter’s variant, which encodes the messages into syndrome
vectors, is to achieve a significant reduction in the number of operations for encryption, though
this is paid with a moderate increase in the number of operations for decryption.
The most effective way to overcome the drawbacks of the McEliece cryptosystem is to
replace Goppa codes with other families of codes, yielding a more compact representation of
their characteristic matrices, and permitting to increase the code rate. Unfortunately, although
several families of codes with such characteristics exist, it is very difficult to replace Goppa
codes with other codes without incurring into serious security flaws, as occurred, for example,
with Gabidulin codes [13] and GRS subcodes [14].
Among the most recent proposals, Quasi-Cyclic (QC) [15], Quasi-Dyadic (QD) [16] and
Quasi-Cyclic Low-Density Parity-Check (QC-LDPC) codes [17] have been considered for pos-
sible inclusion in the McEliece cryptosystem and also in symmetric key secure channel coding
schemes [18]. However, the solutions [15] and [16] have been successfully attacked in [19]
3and [20]. An updated variant of the quasi-dyadic solution has been recently proposed in [21],
and it should be more secure; however, the complexity of the attack in [20] for the binary QD
case is still open, and work is in progress on such issue. The attack procedure described in
[20], [22] exploits an algebraic approach, based on a system of bi-homogeneous polynomial
equations, which holds for the whole class of alternant codes. Hence, such attack concerns all
cryptosystems using codes in this family.
LDPC codes are state-of-art error correcting codes, first introduced by Gallager in the sixties
[23], and more recently rediscovered [24], [25], [26]. While random-based LDPC codes are
able to approach the channel capacity [27], structured LDPC codes have the advantage of an
easier implementation of the encoding and decoding operations, and benefit from reduced storage
requirements [28]. QC-LDPC codes are one of the most important examples of structured LDPC
codes, and they have also been proved to achieve very good performance [29]. The existence of
efficient iterative decoding algorithms for LDPC codes is the distinguishing feature of this class
of codes. The rationale of these algorithms is an iterated updating and exchange of messages
along a bipartite graph, also known as Tanner graph, which represents the code parity-check
matrix. Very good decoding performance is achieved as long as the code Tanner graph is free
of short cycles, that is, closed loops starting and ending at one node. More details on LDPC
decoding will be given in Section III.
Concerning the use of LDPC codes in the McEliece cryptosystem, they were initially thought
to be unable to give significant advantages, due to the fact that the sparse nature of their matrices
cannot be exploited for reducing the key size [30]. Furthermore, adopting very large codes was
found to be necessary for avoiding that the intrinsic code sparsity is exploited by an attack to the
dual of the public code [31]. However, it has also been shown that, by replacing the permutation
matrix used for obtaining the public key with a more general transformation matrix, the code
sparsity can be hidden and the attack to the dual code avoided [32]. Unfortunately, the proposal
in [32] still used only sparse transformations, which exposed it to a total break attack [33].
Subsequently, however, we have presented a simple modification that allows to avoid such flaw,
so obtaining a QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem that is immune to any known attack [34].
This version of the cryptosystem is able to reduce the key size with respect to the original
version and also to use higher code rates, which is in line with the most recent proposals
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Fig. 1. The McEliece cryptosystem based on QC-LDPC codes.
concerning McEliece variants. Moreover, the size of its public keys increases linearly with the
code dimension; so, it scales favorably when larger keys are needed for facing the increasing
computing power.
In this paper, we elaborate on our last proposal, first by describing bit-flipping decoding
[35] for the considered QC-LDPC codes, which yields a significant reduction in the decoding
complexity, at the cost of a moderate loss in terms of error correction. The performance of
bit-flipping decoding can be easily predicted through theoretical arguments, and this helps
dimensioning the system, without the need of long numerical simulations. We also consider the
most effective attack procedures known up to now and estimate analytically their work factor
(WF). This way, we provide tools that allow to easily find the best set of system parameters
aiming at optimizing the trade-off between security and complexity.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section II, we describe the proposed version of QC-
LDPC code-based cryptosystem; in Section III, we describe the encryption and decryption
algorithms and evaluate their complexity; in Section IV, we assess the security level of the
system; finally, Section V concludes the paper.
II. MCELIECE CRYPTOSYSTEM BASED ON QC-LDPC CODES
The main functions of the McEliece cryptosystem based on QC-LDPC codes are shown in
Fig. 1: QC-LDPC codes with length n = n0 ·p, dimension k = k0 ·p and redundancy r = p are
adopted, where n0 is a small integer (e.g., n0 = 3, 4), k0 = n0− 1, and p is a large integer (on
the order of some thousands). For fixed values of the parameters, the private key is formed by
5the sparse parity-check matrix H of one of these codes, randomly chosen, having the following
form:
H = [H0|H1| . . . |Hn0−1] , (1)
that is, a row of n0 circulant blocks Hi, each with row (column) weight dv. Without loss of
generality, we can suppose that Hn0−1 is non singular; so, a systematic generator matrix for
the code is G = [I|P], where I represents the k × k identity matrix and
P =


(
H−1n0−1 ·H0
)T
(
H−1n0−1 ·H1
)T
.
.
.(
H−1n0−1 ·Hn0−2
)T


(2)
where superscript T denotes transposition. Concerning the computation of H−1n0−1, we observe
that the inverse of a circulant matrix can be computed through techniques which are significantly
more efficient than naive inversion [36].
Let us denote by hi, i = 0 . . . n0− 1, the vector containing the positions of symbols 1 in the
first row of the matrix Hi, i = 0 . . . n0 − 1. It is easy to show that, if all the hi vectors have
disjoint sets of differences modulo p, the matrix H is free of length-4 cycles in its associated
Tanner graph. The secret code can be easily constructed by randomly selecting n0 vectors hi with
such property. This permits us to obtain large families of codes with identical parameters [32].
Under the LDPC decoding viewpoint, most of the codes in a family have the same properties;
so, they show comparable error correction performance when belief propagation [37] decoding
algorithms are adopted.
In the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem, Bob chooses a secret QC-LDPC code by gener-
ating its parity-check matrix, H, and chooses two more secret matrices: a k × k non singular
scrambling matrix S and an n × n non singular transformation matrix Q with row/column
weight m. Then, he obtains a systematic generator matrix G for the secret code, in the form
G = [I|P], and produces his public key as:
G′ = S−1 ·G ·Q−1. (3)
The public key is a dense matrix, but, since we adopt QC-LDPC codes, the knowledge of one
6row of each circulant block is sufficient to describe it. We notice that, differently from the
original McEliece cryptosystem, the public code is not permutation-equivalent to the private
code. In fact, the permutation matrix used in the original system [1] has been replaced by Q,
that is a sparse n×n matrix, with row and column weight m > 1. This way, the LDPC matrix
of the secret code (H) is mapped into a new parity-check matrix valid for the public code:
H′ = H ·QT (4)
and, through a suitable choice of m, the density of H′ can be made high enough to avoid
attacks to the dual code.
Alice fetches G′ from the public directory, divides her message into k-bit words, and applies
the encryption map as follows:
x = u ·G′ + e, (5)
where x is the ciphertext corresponding to the cleartext u, and e is a random vector of t′
intentional errors. After receiving x, Bob inverts the transformation as follows:
x′ = x ·Q = u · S−1 ·G+ e ·Q, (6)
thus obtaining a codeword of the secret LDPC code affected by the error vector e · Q, with
weight ≤ t = t′m. Bob must be able to correct all the errors through LDPC decoding and to
obtain u′ = u · S−1. Finally, he can recover u from u′, through multiplication by S.
We note from (6) that the introduction of the matrix Q causes an error propagation effect
(at most by a factor m) within each received frame. This is compensated by the high error
correction capability of the QC-LDPC code, that must be able to correct up to t errors. Suitable
QC-LDPC codes can be designed for such purpose. However, we must also note that, contrary
to the McEliece cryptosystem based on Goppa codes, which corrects all errors of a certain
prescribed weight, the decoding radius of LDPC codes is usually unknown. So, there is a
small probability that Bob fails to recover the secret message. To prevent such event, different
procedures can be implemented. First, Bob can make a careful selection of the private code,
rather than just picking up the first code randomly generated. In fact, the number of codes
that can be obtained through random-based approaches, like random difference families [32], is
impressively high. Secondly, when the cryptosystem is used for data transmissions, an automatic
7repeat request (ARQ) protocol can allow Alice to know whether Bob is able to correct all the
errors she has randomly introduced or not. Indeed, Bob is able to detect uncorrected frames
through the parity check performed by the LDPC decoder, and, consequently, he can request
retransmission. In this case, a new random vector is generated by Alice, and the procedure is
repeated until a correctable error pattern is obtained. In principle, this exposes the system to
message-resend attacks, but simple modifications of the cryptosystem are known which prevent
these attacks without significant drawbacks [38], [39]. As will be observed in the next section,
using these conversions is also advantageous from the key size standpoint. Obviously, this
additional effort increases the latency, but the problem is not serious if the number of errors is
properly chosen and controlled.
III. ENCRYPTION, DECRYPTION AND THEIR COMPLEXITY
A. Key size and transmission rate
In the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem, due to the special form (1) of the matrix H,
the code rate is (n0 − 1)/n0. In the following, we will focus on two values of n0, namely:
n0 = 3, 4, which give transmission rates equal to 2/3 and 3/4, respectively.
Concerning the key size, we observe that, in the considered system, the public key is a binary
matrix formed by k0 × n0 = (n0 − 1)× n0 circulant blocks, each with size p× p. Since each
circulant block is completely described by a single row (or column), that is, p bits, the public
key size is k0 · n0 · p = (n0 − 1) · n0 · p bits.
This size can be further reduced if we consider that a suitable conversion is needed to make
the McEliece cryptosystem secure against some classical attacks, like partial message knowledge
and message resend attacks [39]. Attacks of this kind can be avoided by using some CCA2-
secure variants of the McEliece cryptosystem, which have in common the idea of scrambling
the input messages. When these variants are used, the public matrix can be put in systematic
form [5], so the memory needed to store it becomes k0 · (n0 − k0) · p = (n0 − 1) · p bits.
The values of the key size (expressed in bytes), estimated considering the use of a CCA2-
secure variant, are reported in Table I, for n0 = 3, 4 and for a set of values of p we will
consider throughout the paper. All choices of the system parameters we have considered give
smaller key size and higher transmission rate than those of the original McEliece cryptosystem
8[1] and its Niederreiter version [10]. Considering a CCA2-secure conversion, both they have a
key length of 32750 bytes, and rate 0.51 and 0.57, respectively.
TABLE I
PUBLIC KEY SIZE EXPRESSED IN BYTES.
p [bits] 4096 5120 6144 7168 8192 9216 10240 11264 12288 13312 14336 15360 16384
n0 = 3 1024 1280 1536 1792 2048 2304 2560 2816 3072 3328 3584 3840 4096
n0 = 4 1536 1920 2304 2688 3072 3456 3840 4224 4608 4992 5376 5760 6144
B. Multiplication by circulant matrices
A fundamental point for reducing complexity in the considered cryptosystem is to adopt
efficient algorithms for performing multiplication of a circulant matrix by a vector.
Since circulant matrices are also Toeplitz matrices, an effective algorithm for fast computation
of vector-matrix products is the Winograd convolution [40]. The Winograd algorithm is a
generalization of the Karatsuba-Ofman algorithm, that has been reviewed even recently, in
the perspective to allow fast VLSI implementations [41]. If we consider a p×p Toeplitz matrix
T, with even p, we can decompose it as follows:
T =

T0 T1
T2 T0

 =

I 0 I
0 I I




T1 −T0 0 0
0 T2 −T0 0
0 0 T0




0 I
I 0
I I

 , (7)
where I and 0 are the p/2 × p/2 identity and null matrices, respectively, and T0,T1,T2 are
p/2×p/2 Toeplitz matrices, as well as T1−T0 and T2−T0. It follows that the multiplication
of a vector V = [V0 V1] by the matrix T can be split into three phases:
• Evaluation phase: multiplication of V by the first matrix translates into the addition of
two p/2-bit vectors (V0 and V1); so, its cost, in terms of binary operations, is p/2.
• Multiplication phase: the vector resulting from the evaluation phase must be multiplied
by the second matrix. This translates into 3 vector-matrix products by p/2× p/2 Toeplitz
matrices. If p/2 is even, the three multiplications can be computed in a recursive way, by
splitting each of them into four p/4 × p/4 blocks. If p/2 is odd (or sufficiently small to
make splitting no more advantageous), the vector-matrix multiplication can be performed
in the traditional way and its complexity is about (p/2)2 /2.
9• Interpolation phase: the result of the multiplication phase must be multiplied by the third
matrix. This requires 2 additions of p/2-bit vectors, that is, further p binary operations.
The matrix G′ used in the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem is formed by k0×n0 circulant
blocks with size p × p. When a vector is multiplied by such matrix, we can split the vector
into k0-bit subvectors and consider k0 ·n0 vector-matrix multiplications. However, we must take
into account that the evaluation phase on the k0-bit subvectors must be performed only once,
and that further (k0 − 1) · n0 · p binary operations are needed for re-combining the result of
multiplication by each column of circulants.
C. Encryption operations and complexity
Encryption is performed by calculating the product u ·G′ and then adding the intentional
error vector e. So, the encryption complexity can be estimated by considering the cost of a
vector-matrix multiplication through the Winograd convolution and adding n binary operations
for summing the intentional error vector.
Table II reports the values of the encryption complexity, expressed in terms of the number
of binary operations needed for each encrypted bit, as a function of the circulant matrix size p,
for n0 = 3 and n0 = 4. The use of the Winograd convolution is particularly efficient when p
is a power of 2, since, in such cases, recursion can be exploited to the utmost.
TABLE II
BINARY OPERATIONS NEEDED FOR EACH ENCRYPTED BIT.
p [bits] 4096 5120 6144 7168 8192 9216 10240 11264 12288 13312 14336 15360 16384
n0 = 3 726 823 919 1005 1092 1178 1236 1351 1380 1524 1510 1697 1639
n0 = 4 956 1081 1206 1321 1437 1552 1624 1783 1811 2013 1984 2244 2157
The values reported in Table II refer to the case of a non-systematic G′, that is, a generator
matrix formed by n0−1×n0 generic circulant matrices. Actually, when a CCA2-secure variant
of the system is used, G′ can be put in systematic form, and, in this case, only n0 − 1
vector-matrix multiplications are needed, for the non-systematic part. However, to implement a
CCA2-secure variant, some suitable scrambling operation must be performed on the message,
before multiplication by G′. In this case, the complexity depends on the chosen variant, and
becomes more involved to estimate. Since message scrambling followed by systematic coding
10
is approximately equivalent to non-systematic coding, we prefer to consider the latter, which
allows for a straightforward complexity estimation.
D. Decryption operations and complexity
Bob must perform the following three operations for decrypting the received message:
1) calculate the product x ·Q;
2) decode the secret LDPC code;
3) calculate the product u′ · S.
Matrices Q and S are formed, respectively, by n0×n0 and k0× k0 circulant blocks. However,
while the matrix S is dense, the matrix Q is sparse (with row/column weight m ≪ n). So,
it is advantageous to use the traditional multiplication (requiring n ·m binary operations) for
calculating the product x · Q. On the contrary, the complexity of step 3) can be reduced by
resorting to the Winograd convolution for efficient multiplication of a vector by a circulant
matrix. Concerning step 2), Bob must exploit the secret LDPC matrix to implement a suitable
decoding algorithm for trying to correct all intentional errors (that are ≤ t = t′m). LDPC
decoding is usually accomplished through iterative decoding algorithms, which work on the
code Tanner graph, and implement the belief propagation principle to provide very good error
correction capability. Among them: the sum-product algorithm (SPA) [42] and the bit-flipping
(BF) algorithm [35]. The SPA exploits real valued messages and ensures the best performance
on channels with soft information, though with some dependence on finite precision issues [43].
When soft information from the channel is not available, as it occurs in our case, it may be
advantageous to use the BF algorithm, which works on binary messages and requires very low
complexity, though its performance is not as good as that of the SPA.
The principle of the BF algorithm was devised in Gallager’s seminal work for LDPC codes
with a tree representation [35]. Given an LDPC parity-check matrix with column weight dv, the
variable nodes of its Tanner graph are initially filled in with the received codeword bits. During
an iteration, every check node ci sends each neighboring variable node vj the binary sum of all
its neighboring variable nodes other than vj . So, each variable node receives dv parity-check
sums. In order to send a message back to each neighboring check node ci, the node vj counts
the number of unsatisfied parity-check sums from check nodes other than ci. Let us denote by
b ≤ dv − 1 a suitably chosen integer; if the number of unsatisfied parity-check sums counted
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by vj is greater than or equal to b, then vj flips its value and sends it to ci; otherwise, it sends
its initial value unchanged to ci. At the next iteration, the check sums are updated with such
new values, until all of them are satisfied or a maximum number of iterations is reached.
A relevant issue concerns the choice of b. Two algorithms, commonly named A and B, were
originally proposed by Gallager [35]: in Algorithm A, the value is fixed to b = dv − 1, while
in Algorithm B it can vary between ⌈dv/2⌉ and dv − 1 during decoding (⌈·⌉ is the ceiling
function). Algorithm A is simpler to implement, but Algorithm B ensures better performance.
We have already observed that, differently from algebraic hard-decision codes, the decoding
radius of LDPC codes is generally unknown. So, numerical simulations are usually exploited
for estimating the performance, but such approach is time demanding and unpractical for the
purpose of dimensioning the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem. In the following, we show
how to estimate the performance of the BF algorithm, when applied in the considered scenario,
through theoretical arguments that are very similar to those developed in [44].
Let us suppose that Bob, after having received the ciphertext, performs decoding through
Algorithm A. At each iteration of the algorithm, we denote by pcc the probability that a bit is not
in error and a generic parity-check equation evaluates it correctly. Instead, pci is the probability
that a bit is not in error and a parity-check equation evaluates it incorrectly. Similarly, pic and pii
are the probabilities that a bit is in error and a parity-check equation evaluates it correctly and
incorrectly, respectively. In the considered context, by using simple combinatorial arguments,
it is possible to verify that the following expressions hold:


pcc (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j even
(dc−1
j
)(n−dc
ql−j
)
(n−1
ql
)
pci (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j odd
(dc−1
j
)(n−dc
ql−j
)
(n−1
ql
)
pic (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j even
(dc−1
j
)( n−dc
ql−1−j
)
(n−1
ql−1
)
pii (ql) =
∑min{dc−1,ql}
j=0
j odd
(dc−1
j
)( n−dc
ql−1−j
)
(n−1
ql−1
)
, (8)
where dc = n0 · dv is the row weight of the matrix H and ql is the average number of residual
errors after the l-th iteration. It must be q0 ≤ t = t′m; we fix q0 = t = t′m in order to obtain
worst-case estimates (maximum error propagation).
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Let us suppose that, after the l-th iteration, the estimate of a bit is in error. Based on (8),
we can calculate the probability that, during the subsequent iteration, the message originating
from its corresponding variable node is correct; this can be expressed as:
f b (ql) =
dv−1∑
j=b
(
dv − 1
j
)[
pic (ql)
]j[
pii (ql)
]dv−1−j
. (9)
Similarly, the probability of incorrectly evaluating, in a single iteration of the algorithm, a bit
that is not in error can be expressed as:
gb (ql) =
dv−1∑
j=b
(
dv − 1
j
)[
pci (ql)
]j
[pcc (ql)]
dv−1−j. (10)
Under the ideal assumption of a cycle-free Tanner graph (which implies to consider an
infinite-length code), the average number of residual bit errors at the l-th iteration, ql, results
in:
ql = t− t · f
b (ql−1) + (n− t) · g
b (ql−1) . (11)
Based on this recursive procedure, we can calculate a waterfall threshold by finding the maxi-
mum value t = tth such that lim
l→∞
(ql) = 0.
Actually, different values of tth can be found by different choices of b. So, rather than
resorting only to Algorithm A (in which b = dv − 1 is fixed), we can also optimize the choice
of b by looking for the minimum tth for each b ∈ {⌈dv/2⌉ , . . . , dv − 1}. This way, variants of
Algorithm A with better choices of b can be obtained. For each set of code parameters, we will
refer to the optimal choice of b in the following.
Table III reports the threshold values, so obtained, for several values of the circulant block
size p, code rates 2/3 (n0 = 3) and 3/4 (n0 = 4), and two values of column weight: dv = 13, 15.
TABLE III
THRESHOLD VALUES FOR BF DECODING WITH FIXED (OPTIMAL) b.
p [bits] 4096 5120 6144 7168 8192 9216 10240 11264 12288 13312 14336 15360 16384
n0 = 3
dv = 13 190 237 285 333 380 428 476 523 571 619 666 714 762
dv = 15 192 240 288 336 384 432 479 527 575 622 670 718 766
n0 = 4
dv = 13 181 225 270 315 360 405 450 495 540 585 630 675 720
dv = 15 187 233 280 327 374 421 468 515 561 608 655 702 749
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In more realistic scenarios, with finite code lengths and closed loops in the Tanner graphs,
and also adopting a finite number of decoding iterations, there is no guarantee that the error
rate is arbitrarily small for t ≤ tth. In this sense, the values in Table III should be seen as an
optimistic assumption. However, we can observe that the performance achievable by BF with
fixed b can be improved in a number of ways.
One of these improvements has been mentioned above, and consists in using Algorithm B (i.e.,
variable b). On the other hand, more recently, the original Gallager algorithms have been made
more efficient through further, and more elaborated, variants [45], [46]. Such improved versions
reduce the gap in performance with respect to the SPA, which is able to reach extremely small
error rates for values of t even above the BF threshold tth [17]. So, taking into account these
aspects, we can consider the BF threshold values as reliable approximations of the decoding
radius of the considered QC-LDPC codes.
As concerns complexity, we can estimate the number of binary operations needed for each
iteration of the algorithm over the code Tanner graph. During an iteration, each check node
receives dc binary values and EX-ORs them, for a total of dc − 1 binary sums. The result is
then EX-ORed again with the message coming from each variable node before sending it back
to the same node, thus requiring further dc binary sums. So, the total number of operations
at check nodes is r(2dc − 1). Similarly, each variable node receives dv check sum values and
counts the number of them that are unsatisfied; this requires dv operations. After that, for each
neighboring check node, any variable node updates the number of unsatisfied check sums by
excluding the message received from that node and compares the result with the threshold b;
this requires further 2dv operations. So, the total number of operations at variable nodes is
n(3dv). In conclusion, the cost of one iteration of bit flipping can be estimated as
C
(1)
BF = r (2dc − 1) + n (3dv) = 5ndv − r. (12)
Based on (12), and considering the computational effort required for calculating the x ·Q and
u′ ·S products, we can estimate the total cost, in terms of binary operations, for each decrypted
bit. The values obtained are reported in Table IV, where m = 7 has been assumed and a BF
algorithm with 10 average iterations has been considered.
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TABLE IV
BINARY OPERATIONS NEEDED FOR EACH DECRYPTED BIT BY USING BF DECODING.
p [bits] 4096 5120 6144 7168 8192 9216 10240 11264 12288 13312 14336 15360 16384
n0 = 3
dv = 13 1476 1544 1611 1668 1726 1784 1827 1899 1928 2014 2014 2130 2101
dv = 15 1626 1694 1761 1818 1876 1934 1977 2049 2078 2164 2164 2280 2251
n0 = 4
dv = 13 1598 1694 1790 1877 1963 2050 2107 2223 2252 2396 2381 2569 2511
dv = 15 1731 1828 1924 2010 2097 2183 2241 2356 2385 2529 2515 2702 2644
By using the same parameters, and considering v = 6 quantization bits for the decoder
messages, we have estimated the decryption complexity with SPA decoding [17]; the results
are reported in Table V. To decode by using the SPA guarantees the best error correction
performance at the threshold value t = tth. However, in comparison with Table IV, the adoption
of BF decoding gives a significant advantage over the SPA in terms of decryption complexity.
TABLE V
BINARY OPERATIONS NEEDED FOR EACH DECRYPTED BIT BY USING SPA DECODING.
p [bits] 4096 5120 6144 7168 8192 9216 10240 11264 12288 13312 14336 15360 16384
n0 = 3
dv = 13 9791 9859 9926 9983 10041 10099 10142 10214 10243 10329 10329 10445 10416
dv = 15 11261 11329 11396 11453 11511 11569 11612 11684 11713 11799 11799 11915 11886
n0 = 4
dv = 13 9068 9164 9260 9347 9433 9520 9577 9693 9722 9866 9851 10039 9981
dv = 15 10375 10471 10567 10653 10740 10826 10884 10999 11028 11172 11158 11345 11288
IV. SECURITY LEVEL
Attacks can be divided into two classes:
• structural attacks, aimed at recovering the secret code;
• decoding attacks, aimed at decrypting the transmitted ciphertext.
A. Structural attacks
Structural attacks against the McEliece cryptosystem aim at recovering the secret code from
the public one; thus, they are strongly influenced by the family of codes used.
The original proposal of using binary Goppa codes has still never suffered a structural attack.
Recently, a new class of distinguishers has been proposed for high rate McEliece cryptosystems
[47]. They allow to distinguish the generator matrix of a Goppa code from a randomly picked
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binary matrix, under the condition that the code rate is very high (i.e., close to 1). Though
this is an important result, it does not concern most Goppa-based instances of the McEliece
cryptosystem, in which code rates below 0.8 are used.
With the aim of reducing the size of the public key, it has been attempted many times to
replace binary Goppa codes with other families of codes. In order to meet the target, the codes
must have a structured nature, which allows achieving compact matrix representations, but, on
the other hand, may be exploited by suitably devised structural attacks.
Two of the most interesting proposals of this type are those considering QC and QD codes
[15], [16], which are able to achieve strong reductions in the key size with respect to classical
Goppa codes. The codes used in these systems are still algebraic codes which fall in the class
of alternant codes. A first attack against these variants has been presented in [19], and exploits
linear redundancies in subfield subcodes of GRS codes. An even more effective attack proce-
dure against them has been proposed in [20], [22], and exploits a system of bi-homogeneous
polynomial equations which hold for alternant codes. The structured nature of the QC and QD
codes used in [15] and [16] results in a set of highly structured algebraic equations, which
allow to mount an efficient key-recovery attack.
The system we consider is based on codes which are basically designed at random, apart
from the need to avoid short cycles in their Tanner graphs. So, they do not have any algebraic
structure, which prevents structural attacks of this kind.
The proposed system is also immune against the new class of distinguishers proposed in [47].
In fact, the transformation there proposed cannot be applied to the QC-LDPC codes of the type
we consider, due to the lack of algebraic structure. Although the existence of a distinguisher
cannot be considered as a proof of weakness, the non-existence is a further argument in favor
of the robustness of the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem.
The most dangerous structural attacks against the considered cryptosystem come from the
existence of a sparse matrix representation for the private code. In fact, if one tries to exploit
the sparse nature of LDPC codes for reducing the public key size, density reduction attacks can
be mounted, which are able to recover the private parity-check matrix [30], [31], [48]. Even
though the sparse representation is hidden for the public code, but the latter is still permutation
equivalent to the private code, it may be recovered by an attacker through a search for low
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weight codewords in the dual of the public code [31]. So, when using LDPC codes, the public
code must not be permutation equivalent to the private one, as instead occurs in the original
McEliece cryptosystem. We have shown in [17], [34] that this can be achieved by using the
transformation matrix Q in the place of a permutation P for computing the public key.
As already shown in Section II, the matrix Q must be sparse in order to allow correcting all
intentional errors. If also the matrix S is chosen to be sparse [32], a structural attack still exists
[33], which is able to recover a sparse representation for the secret code. However, it suffices to
choose a dense matrix S, as in the original McEliece cryptosystem, to avoid such attack [34].
B. Decoding attacks
Due to the low weight (t′) of the intentional error vector, decoding attacks against the
considered system are often more dangerous than structural attacks, and provide the smallest
WF. These attacks aim at solving the decoding problem, that is, obtaining the error vector e
used for encrypting a ciphertext. A way for finding e is to search for the minimum weight
codewords of an extended code, generated by:
G′′ =

 G′
x

 . (13)
The WF of such attacks can be determined by referring to the Stern’s algorithm [3]. More
precisely, we have used an updated version of this algorithm [6], that results in minimum WF for
the class of codes here considered. It must be said that several advances have recently appeared
in the literature for improving the running time of the best decoding algorithms for binary
random codes (see [7], [9], for example). These papers, however, often aim at evaluating the
performance of information set decoding in asymptotic conditions, i.e., for codes with infinite
length, while we prefer to rely on actual operation counts, which are not reflected in these recent
works. Another recent advance in this direction is represented by “ball collision decoding” [8],
which is able to achieve important WF reductions asymptotically. However, for finite code
lengths and security levels even above those of interest here, such improvement is negligible
[8].
On the other hand, we must observe that, in the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem, a
further speedup is obtained by considering that, because of the quasi-cyclic property of the
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codes, each block-wise cyclically shifted version of the ciphertext x is still a valid ciphertext.
So, the eavesdropper can continue extending G′′ by adding block-wise shifted versions of x,
and can search for one among as many shifted versions of the error vector. So, in order to
estimate the minimum WF, we have considered the optimum number of shifted ciphertexts that
can be used by an attacker in the generator matrix of the extended code.
For each QC-LDPC code, we have calculated the maximum number of intentional errors
t′ = ⌊t/m⌋ by considering m = 7 and the estimated error correction capability t reported in
Table III. The values obtained are reported in Table VI.
The minimum WF values, obtained in such conditions, are shown in Table VII. For n0 = 3,
the WF of the attack to the dual code, also based on the improved version of Stern’s algorithm,
is about 2161, when dv = 13, and 2184, when dv = 15. So, we have reported the former of
such values in Table VII for those cases in which the decoding attack WF would be higher.
The same has been done for n0 = 4, for which the WF of the attack to the dual code is about
2154 and 2176 for dv = 13 and dv = 15, respectively.
TABLE VI
NUMBER OF INTENTIONAL ERRORS t′ INTRODUCED BY ALICE.
p [bits] 4096 5120 6144 7168 8192 9216 10240 11264 12288 13312 14336 15360 16384
n0 = 3
dv = 13 27 33 40 47 54 61 68 74 81 88 95 102 108
dv = 15 27 34 41 48 54 61 68 75 82 88 95 102 109
n0 = 4
dv = 13 25 32 38 45 51 57 64 70 77 83 90 96 102
dv = 15 26 33 40 46 53 60 66 73 80 86 93 100 107
TABLE VII
SECURITY LEVEL OF THE QC-LDPC CODE-BASED CRYPTOSYSTEM FOR m = 7.
p [bits] 4096 5120 6144 7168 8192 9216 10240 11264 12288 13312 14336 15360 16384
n0 = 3
dv = 13 2
54 263 273 284 294 2105 2116 2125 2135 2146 2157 2161 2161
dv = 15 2
54 264 275 285 294 2105 2116 2126 2137 2146 2157 2168 2179
n0 = 4
dv = 13 2
60 273 285 298 2109 2121 2134 2146 2153 2154 2154 2154 2154
dv = 15 2
62 275 288 2100 2113 2127 2138 2152 2165 2176 2176 2176 2176
In order to give an example of system design, we can consider the parameters of the Goppa
code suggested in [5] for achieving 80-bit security (i.e., WF = 280), that are: n = 1632,
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k = 1269 and t = 33. Under a suitable CCA2-secure conversion, they give a key size of 57581
bytes for both the McEliece cryptosystem and the Niederreiter version. The encryption and
decryption complexities, estimated through the formulas in [49, p. 27], result in 817 and 2472
operations per bit, respectively, for the McEliece cryptosystem and 48 and 7890 operations per
bit for the Niederreiter version. The transmission rate is 0.78 for the McEliece cryptosystem
and 0.63 for the Niederreiter version.
A similar security level can be reached by the QC-LDPC code-based cryptosystem with n0 =
4, p = 6144 and dv = 13. In this case, as reported in Table I, the public key size is 2304 bytes,
i.e., 25 times smaller than in the Goppa code-based McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems.
The transmission rate is 0.75, similar to that of the Goppa code-based McEliece cryptosystem
and higher than in the Niederreiter version. The encryption and decryption complexities, as
reported in Tables II and IV, result in 1206 and 1790 operations per bit, respectively. So, the
complexity increases in the encryption stage, but, by exploiting the BF algorithm, the decryption
complexity is reduced.
So, we can conclude that, for achieving the same security level, the QC-LDPC code-based
cryptosystem can adopt smaller keys and comparable or higher transmission rates with respect
to the classical Goppa code-based McEliece and Niederreiter cryptosystems. Moreover, this
does not come at the expense of a significantly increased complexity.
V. CONCLUSION
We have deepened the analysis of a variant of the McEliece cryptosystem using QC-LDPC
codes in the place of Goppa codes. Such modification is aimed at overcoming the main
drawbacks of the original system, while still allowing to reach a satisfactory security level.
We have proposed to adopt bit flipping algorithms for decoding the QC-LDPC codes, in
such a way as to achieve a rather good performance while strongly reducing the decoding
complexity with respect to the SPA. The adoption of bit flipping decoding has also allowed to
develop simple analytical tools for estimating the error correction capability of the considered
codes, thus simplifying the system design by avoiding the need for long numerical simulations.
Together with the methods we have described to evaluate complexity, these tools provide the
system designer with a fast procedure for optimizing the choice of the cryptosystem parameters.
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